



Recurring deficits in the United States' trade
with the rest of the world have generated pres-
sure on the Administration and Congress to
redress the imbalance. Trade disputes with thE'
European Community, Canada, japan and other
nations haVE' bE'comE' commonplace, and Con-
gress is awash in trade legislation that, if passed
into law, could dramatically alter the "rules of
the game" by which the u.s. conducts business
with other nations. This Letter outlines major
features of recent trade policy actions and ana-
lyzes the content, and potential economic con-
sequences, of the major omnibus trade
legislation pending in the Congress.
Background
Since 1982, the U.S. has incurred increasingly
large deficits in its international trade accounts
(see Chart). As yet, there is no sign of improve-
ment despite the more than 25 percent decline
in the trade-weighted value of the dollar over
the past year and a half. Instead, the trade deficit
in constant dollars has grown from $108 billion
in 1985 to a record annualized level of $150 bil-
lion in the second quarter of 1986. Behind these
burgeoning trade deficit numbers are workers
and firms in the export and import-competing
sectors that have lost jobs and sales to stiff for-
eign competition.
Continued deterioration of the u.s. trade posi-
tion has distressed policymakers and put
increasing pressure on the Administration to pro-
tect domestic industry from foreign competition.
It has also put pressure on Congress to initiate
and carry forward legislation designed to slow
imports, raise exports, and reduce the trade
deficit.
Within the past several months, the u.s. has
increased protection of domestic industry
through a variety of formal and informal mea-
sures. Some of the major actions include
increased tariffs on shingles and shakes imported
from Canada, an agreement that sets minimum
prices on a variety of japanese computer chip
imports, and negotiation of "voluntary" limits to
the import of machine tools and textiles.
Protectionist pressure is not confined to the
Administration, however. Congress is presently
considering dozens of bills dealing with various
aspects of the international trade issue. Most
recently, President Reagan vetoed - and the
House of Representatives failed to overturn - a
major textiles bill (1985 Textile and Apparel
Trade Enforcement Act) that would have cut
back textile imports from the major producing
countries (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong
Kong). The bill would also have held the growth
of textile imports from most countries to one
percent a year while explicitly relating import
growth to the growth of the U.S. market.
HR4800
Even more sweeping and potentially important
in its implications for U.S. trade policy is an
omnibus trade bill (HR4800) that was over-
whelmingly passed by the House in May despite
strong opposition from the Reagan
Administration.
The Trade and International Policy Reform Act
of 1986 is 458 pages long and quite complex.
Six committees in the House contributed various
portions of this trade legislation. HR4800, if
passed into law, would restrict Presidential dis-
cretion in trade matters, vastly broaden the defi-
nition of "unfair" trade practices, and could
force negotiations with countries such as japan
and Taiwan to cut "excessive" trade surpluses
with the U.S. Moreover, several of the bill's
provisions apparently violate GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) - the basic .
international trade agreement between the u.s.
and most of its trading partners.
Present law (1974 Trade Act) permits the Presi-
dent to make the final determination asto
whether a foreign trading practice is unfair and
what, if any, retaliatory action is in the national
interest. The Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) investigates complaints of
unfair foreign trading practices and makes re-FRBSF
commendations to the President. HR4800 would
sharply curtail the President's discretionary
power and expand the role of the USTR.
In particular, the bill would transfer authority to
determine whether a foreign trading practice
was unfair from the President to the USTR and
require the President (1) to retaliate when the
practice violates existing trade agreements
(unless the USTR specifies that retaliation is not
in the national interest), and (2) to offset fully the
practices of foreign governments of subsidizing
or otherwise favoring export industriesthrough
industrial or other policies (soccalled "export
targeting").
The President would also be required under
HR4800 to negotiate with nations to reduce
"excessive" bilateral trade surpluses - defined
as bilateral exports to the U.S. exceeding bilat-
eral nonpetroleum imports by 175 percent or
more - arising from a "pattern of unjustifiable,
unreasonable,and discriminatory policies or
practices." Presidential action would again be
required ifthe bilateral trade negotiations were
not successful. This provision would presumably
have immediate implications for u.s. trade with
Japan, Taiwan,and others.
The omnibus trade bill also extends the present
definition of an "unreasonable" trade practice to
include denial of certain workers' rights, such as
collective bargaining, stipulations of child labor
laws, and health and safety standards. The Presi-
dent would be permittedto take retaliatory
action against nations - which would presum-
ably include a large number of developing and
Soviet bloc countries - that do not conform to
these international labor standards.
Present u.s. trade law - in conformity with
GATT's "escape clause" - allows the President
to impose tariffs or quotas on imports, or provide
adjustment assistance, if the u.s. International
Trade Commission (lTC) finds that a domestic
industry is materially hurt by foreign imports
even in the absence of unfair trade practices.
HR4800 would transfer the authority to impose
import restrictions in these "relief" cases from
thePresident to the USTR, and would also
remove Presidential discretion by requiring auto-
matic consideration of trade adjustmentassis-
tance under expedited procedures ifthe ITC
makes an injury ruling. Also, and apparently in
conflict with GATT, the proposed legislation
would allow emergency import relief before a
final ITe injury ruling has been made if circum-
stances exist where a delay in relief would sig-
nificantly impair its effectiveness.
Other major provisions in the bill would expand
the types of foreign export subsidies and dump-
ing subject to retaliation, change tariffs on more
than sixty individual commodities, expand con-
trols on u.s. exports of crude oil, and require
the Treasury to calculate "competitive"
exchange rates and to report regularly to Con-
gress on progress toward achieving them. The
trade bill also contains a wide variety of provi-
sions concerning monetary reform, telecom-
munications markets, retraining and employing
displaced workers, and foreign violations of
intellectual property rights.
Economic costs
Recent trade actions and pending legislation in
the Congress, if passed into law, could reduce
trade deficits, at least initially. Higher tariffs,
quotas, and "marketing agreements" designed
to limit imports and raise exports, however, also
could increase foreign retaliation and thereby
reduce our exports. The resulting net effect on
the trade balance would be ambiguous.
Are the measures then worth the cost? The con-
sumer cost of trade restrictions is very high.
Trade restrictions on clothing, sugar and auto-
mobiles alone forced consumers to spend
between $14-20 billion more on these products
in 1984, according to a recent study by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. And the
major increase in restrictions on imported steel
products imposed less than two years ago is
conservatively estimated to have cost u.S. con-
sumers $2 billion in 1985 alone. The consumer
cost of all existing trade restrictions combined
with the restrictions that would be in force if
HR4800 became law and were vigorously
enforced could be enormous.
Other costs to society are more difficult to quan-
tify but potentially even more important. Beyond
raising costs to consumers and limiting con-
sumer choice of products, increased protection
of domestic industry from foreign competition
also reduces incentives for u.S. firms to operate
efficiently and hinders their long-run interna-
tional competitive position.
Protectionist moves by the u.s. also run the risk
of escalating retaliatory actions by other nations
and closing off markets to u.s. exporters. TwoThe U.5. has actively pursued the benefits of free
trade through successive GATT trade liberali'za-
tion rounds for the greater part of the post-war
period, but some current reactions to the succes-
sive string of unprecedentedly large U.S. trade
deficits threaten these past efforts. They have put
growing pressure on the Administration and the
Congress to protect domestic industry from for-
eign competition.
Although politically expedient, the reduction of
trade deficits through heightened import restric-
tions is clearly a "second best" solution to the
trade problem. The rise in U.5. trade deficits
since 1981 was not caused by increasing protec-
tionist moves abroad that shut out U.5. exports.
Rather, it was caused by the 1980-85 apprecia-
tion of the dollar in the foreign exchange mar-
kets and the more rapid growth of the U.S.
economy than economies abroad.
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prices. At times, a nation facing foreign competi-
tion must, however, endure large adjustment
costs as firms and workers move to produce
those products in which they have a compara-
tive advantage. This adjustment is often painful,
time-consuming, and may weigh on certain
regions of the nation disproportionately. Nev-
ertheless, our history with trade protectionism
(e.g., the Smoot-Hawley legislation raising tariffs
in 1930 caused immediate foreign retaliation, a
massive reduction in international trade, and
exacerbated the severity of the Great Depres-
sion) suggests that the longer term benefits of
free trade far outweigh the costs.
Time delays between a change in exchange rate
movements and improvements in the trade bal-
ance are long and variable. Nonetheless, vir-
tually all economists and forecasters are
predicting significant reductions in U.5. trade
deficits in the months to come due both to the
falling dollar and the slowdown in U.S. eco-
nomic growth. If the u.S. could withstand politi-
cal pressures, its trade balance and the competi-
tive conditions facing U.5. firms should improve
of their own accord.
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recent examples illustrate this danger. The Euro-
pean Community (EC) raised tariffs on U.5. citrus
exports in response to the u.s. tariff on imported
pasta last November. Similarly, Canada in-
creased its "compensating duties" on certain
U.S. published material, computer parts, and
semiconductors in response to the 35 percent
duty imposed by the u.s. on Canadian cedar
shingles and shakes.
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Escalating tensions of this nature threaten to
undermine both the new round of GATT trade
liberalization talks starting this month in Punta
del Este,Uruguay, and negotiations presently
underway to establish a "free-trade" area
between Canada and the U.5. The provisions of
HR4800 therefore could further undermine the
environment for a liberal trading order and, at
worse, ignite a major trade war.
Conclusion
A liberal trading order allowing largely unfet-
tered trade among nations has some major eco-
nomic advantages, including specialization in
production by relatively low cost producers;
greater competition among firms, which would
generate long-term gains inefficiency and inno-
vation; greater consumer choice; and lower
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 200,974 870 6,807 3.5
Loans and Leases 1 6 182,107 102 6,529 3.7
Commercial and Industrial 50,546 225 - 273 - 0.5
Real estate 67,361 23 2,995 4.6
Loans to Individuals 39,354 167 2,637 7.1
Leases 5,501 0 86 1.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,161 782 - 383 - 3.3
Other Securities2 7,706 - 14 660 9.3
Total Deposits 204,871 - 582 7,931 4.0
Demand Deposits 51,193 - 576 5,423 11.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 46,763 -1,248 4,640 11.0
Other Transaction Balances4 16,824 6 3,172 23.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,854 - 13 - 663 - 0.4
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 42,182 -4,658 - 2,871 - 6.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 34,914 - 242 - 3,226 - 8.4
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,135 - 522 - 173 - 0.7
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+llDeficiency (-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change